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Introduction 
A. General outline of the subject in question 
In June 2007, the Sudanese government finally agreed to allow a joint 
African Union/United Nations peacekeeping force into the Darfur region, after 
months of international pressure.1 On 31 July 2007 the UN Security Council, by 
passing resolution 1769, established UNAMID, which was intended to, and 
indeed did, take over its mandated tasks on 31 December 2007.2 This is a unique 
situation of a hybrid operation and it is most likely that problems will occur.3  
This thesis is aimed at evaluating the extent of powers of the joint 
peacekeeping force, both under the AU and the UN peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement laws. It will focus on the extent of powers ratione loci and ratione 
materiae and especially deal with the problem of a potential crossborder 
competence into Chad and the issue of subject matter competence over facilitators 
of the militias. It will also include an assessment of the extent of powers which the 
joint peacekeeping forces have over the Sudanese forces. 
From a legal perspective, all these topics are likely to be controversial 
issues, since the establishment of peacekeeping forces is affiliated with some 
uncertainty as to their classification under the UN-Charter and under the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, and as for the determination of the exact 
scope of their mandate.4  
The particular importance of the two focal points of crossborder competence 
and subject matter authority over facilitators of the militias becomes evident if it 
is looked at from a humanitarian perspective: The Darfur crisis is a conflict which 
caused large numbers of refugees to flee across the Chadian border, while they 
were frequently pursued by their attackers.5 This fact gives rise to the questions 
                                               
1
 Darfur – UNAMID – Background, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/ 
unamid/background.html [accessed 13 December 2007]; cf. also BBC, “Libya hosts Darfur crisis 
talks”, 15 July 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6899323.stm [accessed 23 July 
2007].   
2
 African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ missions/unamid/index.html [accessed 12 December 2007]; BBC, 
“UN takes over Darfur peace force”, 31 December 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/7165443.stm [accessed 8 January 2008]. 
3
 Darfur – UNAMID – Background (note 1); Said Djinnit, cp BBC, “Sudan accepts joint Darfur 
force”, 12 June 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6745691.stm 
[accessed 23 July 2007].  
4
 R Wolfrum and C Philipp, United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Volume 2, p. 961, para 5. 
5
 Cf. infra, chapter III., p. 31 et seq. 
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whether or not UNAMID peacekeepers are mandated to operate on Chadian 
territory and what powers they have with regard to those who back the assailants. 
B. Approach to the topic 
In order to assess the extent of powers of a peacekeeping mission, it is first 
of all crucial to know from where this mission gets its authorization. Therefore the 
first chapter will be concerned with an outline of the UN and AU peacekeeping 
laws, enquiring into the origins and sources of the concept of peacekeeping and 
aiming to display the general principles of United Nations and African Union 
peacekeeping. 
Since, as Chapter I will point out, authorization for a UN peacekeeping 
operation is, first and foremost, given by a Security Council resolution, Chapter II 
will address the issue of how to interpret such resolutions. With the tools 
developed in the second chapter, Security Council resolution 1769, which 
authorizes UNAMID, can subsequently be examined. However, in Chapter II it 
will also be argued that in order to understand such a resolution, it is necessary to 
have as much knowledge as possible of the political background and of the 
Security Council’s involvement in the conflict.6  
Consequently, the third chapter will delineate the history and background of 
the conflict in Darfur as well as the role of the Sudanese government and the 
conduct of both the United Nations and the African Union. 
Subsequent to this descriptive evaluation, Chapter IV will first give a survey 
of the key documents relating to the establishment of UNAMID, followed by a 
detailed analysis of these resolutions, reports and peace agreements. This will 
result in an assessment of the extent of powers of the joint forces in Darfur under 
the UN and the accordant AU peacekeeping laws.  
Finally the last chapter will contain a summary of the conclusions of the 
previous chapters. 
                                               
6
 Cf. MC Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, 2 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law (1998), 73 at 79. 
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Chapter I: UN and AU peacekeeping laws and principles 
In order to be able to evaluate the extent of powers of peacekeeping forces, 
it is important to be familiar with the nature of peacekeeping laws and principles 
under the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. This chapter 
will therefore enquire into the origins of the respective rules and will try to outline 
the general principles of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping. It will 
also examine the relationship between the UN and the AU concerning issues with 
regard to peace and security. 
A. UN peacekeeping laws and principles 
1. Introduction  
As a starting point it is important to know the basis of legal authority for 
peacekeeping operations, from which the general scope of powers of 
peacekeeping forces emanates. A distinction must also be drawn between 
observer missions, peacekeepers and peace enforcement missions. 
First of all I will try to shed some light on the terminology of peacekeeping, 
before briefly tracing the historical development of peacekeeping principles. This 
will be followed by an assessment of the legal authority for peacekeeping 
missions. Furthermore this section will also focus on the general problems which 
arise from the deployment of peacekeepers into civil war conflicts as opposed to 
interstate conflicts.  
2. Definition of peacekeeping 
The UN Charter contains no provision about the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces,7 but in light of the first of the purposes listed in Chapter I, 
Article I of the Charter,8 peacekeeping operations are generally understood as a 
way for the UN to stop or contain disputes which have escalated or have the 
potential to escalate into armed conflicts.9 The present perception of UN 
                                               
7
 Wolfrum/Philipp (note 4), p. 961, para 5; SD Bailey and S Daws, The Procedure of the UN 
Security Council, p. 356. 
8
 Article 1 UN Charter: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might 
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peacekeeping comprises a Security Council-authorized force, mandated to help 
maintain or restore peace, operating under the authority of the UN and composed 
of personnel voluntarily provided by UN member states.10 So peacekeeping 
operations are designed to contain violence and promote stability in the area of 
conflict.11 However, this definition does not determine how much force the 
peacekeepers may use and it says little about the definite difference between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Therefore a closer look at the historical 
development of peacekeeping principles is necessary. 
3. Historical development 
a) UNSCOB 
The historical roots of UN peacekeeping can be traced back to the UN 
Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which was established in 1947, 
when Greece faced an escalating dispute over border violations with its northern 
neighbours Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.12 Confronted with reciprocal 
allegations by the four states, the UN interposed itself between the disputing states 
to prevent a serious armed conflict.13 Since the Security Council was deadlocked 
due to the political impasse between the super powers, UNSCOB was established 
by the General Assembly (GA) and it set up two principles that would later 
become the cornerstones of peacekeeping operations: the impartiality of the 
peacekeepers and the requirement of the host state’s consent.14 However, as these 
two key elements were ignored in the course of the UNSCOB deployment when 
the GA sided with Greece, this early peacekeeping effort was of limited 
effectiveness; Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria refused to cooperate with 
UNSCOB and they did not actively promote settling the dispute with Greece.15 
Therefore the powerful lesson to be learnt from this early experience is that 
without   
at least the appearance of complete neutrality, reflected both in enabling resolutions 
and in behaviour on the ground, UN peacekeepers are unlikely to obtain the critical 
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element of consent and the requisite levels of cooperation from all the parties to a 
dispute.16 
b) UNTSO 
Shortly after UNSCOB, the UN established a Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO), which was the first formal peacekeeping operation.17 In 
May 1948, when the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine had reached a bloody 
impasse, the Security Council first demanded a four week cease-fire, which 
proved to be of little use since both sides resumed fighting after the truce had 
expired.18 Consequently, the Security Council resorted to stronger measures when 
it called for the second truce.19 It used its full Chapter VII authority20 and 
increased the number of military observers who had been sent to monitor the first 
cease-fire.21 This larger military observer mission became known as UNTSO and 
for the first time the United Nations adopted a structured peacekeeping approach 
based on a clear set of operative principles.22 Since UNTSO, UN peace observer 
missions have been set up according to the principles of conduct which were 
contained in the instructions given to the UNTSO troops.23 Count Bernadotte, the 
UN mediator for Palestine who was in charge of supervising the Truce 
Commission,24 instructed the observers to be “completely objective in their 
attitudes” and to “maintain a thorough neutrality as regards political issues in the 
Palestine situation”.25 Although the need for impartiality is a lesson that should 
already have been learnt from the unsuccessful UNSCOB mission, UNTSO failed 
again in this respect as it provided Count Bernadotte with the dual functions of 
observation and mediation which detracted his impartiality.26 This detraction was 
due to the fact that Bernadotte co-mingled the authority and functions of the 
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concepts of peacekeeping (observation) and peacemaking (mediation).27 
Therefore, with regard to its deficiencies, UNTSO proved to be another important 
step on the way to successful, impartial peacekeeping missions. 
Another operative principle contained in Bernadotte’s instructions was the 
prohibition of any use of force.28 This element has, alongside impartiality and the 
requirement of consent of the host state, become the third of the cardinal 
principles that guided UN peacekeeping operations ever since UNTSO.29  
These three principles also composed the distinction between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement missions; peace enforcement operations, deployed with 
Chapter VII authority, may be mandated to use force other than in self defence, 
can take sides with one of the parties in the respective conflict and do not 
necessarily rely on the consent of the host state.30 
c) UNEF 
Eight years after UNTSO had been established, tensions between Israel and 
Egypt over the Suez Canal erupted into fighting and thereby triggered another UN 
peacekeeping operation.31 This Israeli-Egyptian dispute was characteristic of a 
new type of armed conflict which involved frequent and reciprocal military raids 
by the conflicting parties.32 Such parties were more likely to ignore the 
demarcated boundary lines of peace, and the likelihood of cooperation with the 
peacekeepers decreased.33 Therefore a pure military observer mission like 
UNTSO would have been doomed to fail; the UN needed a force capable of 
stopping and arresting violators of the respective peace agreement.34 
Consequently, in 1956, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was positioned 
between the warring parties and the troops were assigned more aggressive 
peacekeeping duties.35 UNEF, unlike the mere observer mission UNTSO, did not 
function under an absolute prohibition of the use of force; the peacekeepers were 
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entitled to respond with force to armed attacks, including attempts to force them 
to withdraw from their authorized positions.36  
However, the principles of impartiality and consent were left intact.37 To 
maintain the neutrality of the force, Dag Hammerskjöld, the UN Secretary-
General from 1953 to 1961, who created this new model for peacekeeping, 
refused troops offered by the permanent five members of the SC as well as troops 
from “any country which for geographical or other reasons might have a special 
interest in the conflict”.38 He also emphasized that the UN could not operate 
peacekeepers on the territory of a country without the consent of the government 
of that country.39 Therefore, since Israel refused to accept the forces on its 
territory, UNEF was only deployed on the Egyptian side of the Armistice 
Demarcated Line40 and the troops were withdrawn when Egypt expelled UNEF in 
1967 in preparation for the Six Day War.41 
While Hammerskjöld had “strengthened the ability of the UN to interpose 
itself between member states at a time when a new type of armed conflict 
situation had exposed the limits of the peace observation model”, there was still a 
great deal of uncertainty concerning the legal basis of peacekeeping operations.42 
As a result of this uncertainty, the constitutionality of UNEF, and by that the 
constitutionality of peacekeeping missions in general, was called into question. In 
December 1961, the GA asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether the 
expenditures for UNEF and ONUC43 constituted “expenses of the 
Organization”.44 By answering this question in the affirmative,45 the Court 
established the legality of peacekeeping.46 
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d) Alteration of the basic principles 
Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping changed its face over the years, especially 
regarding the principle of the use of force only in self-defence.47 In the early 
sixties, the ONUC mission broadened this concept48 and in 1973, with the 
establishment of the Second UN Emergency Force (“UNEF II”), it was extended 
to include force which is used to prevent interference with the peacekeepers’ 
orders and duties.49 In 1992, when the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali attempted to clarify the concept of peacekeeping in his report “An Agenda 
for Peace”, an increased willingness to use force became apparent.50 This could, 
for example, be seen in his implication that consent was no longer an essential 
part of peacekeeping. The need for consent has “traditionally operated as a check 
on the use of force; states are less likely to consent to a peacekeeping operation 
where offensive force is authorized”.51 
In the years after 1988, quite a number of peacekeeping missions came into 
being,52 and these operations grew more complex and multifunctional, including 
political, humanitarian, social and economic components.53 They also set up 
another principal characteristic of UN peacekeeping: The Security Council 
delegated to the Secretary General both the provision and command of the UN 
Forces.54 At the same time, the requirement of consent of the host state became 
less important and was even said to be a pure legal fiction, since in some cases 
either no local government existed or it ceased to exist during the operation.55  
In summary it can be stated that the early UN peacekeeping operations had 
an important impact on the evolution of the basic principles for such missions. 
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However, these tenets have altered over the years, therefore their precise bearing 
on UNAMID is yet to be established. 
4. Legal authority for peacekeeping operations 
As was mentioned above, the UN Charter contains no provision about the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces.56 However, chapters VI and VII provide legal 
authority to encourage peaceful dispute settlement (Chapter VI) and enable the 
UN to resort to the use of force where a conflict has risen to a level which 
threatens international peace and security (Chapter VII).57 The famous 
observation that the legal basis for UN peacekeeping may be found at “Chapter 
VI½“ is frequently attributed to Dag Hammerskjöld.58 What is meant by this is 
that peacekeeping is more than a Chapter VI peaceful measure, but something less 
than a forceful measure under Chapter VII.59 Some legal scholars however, hold 
the opinion that an ad hoc customary rule has been formed with regard to 
peacekeeping operations, which has now taken root with the agreement of all the 
UN member states.60  
Another opinion which has been put forward with respect to the legal 
authority of peacekeeping is the contention that the legal basis can be found in 
article 42 UNC. According to this view, article 42 of the UN Charter – although 
broadly interpreted – clearly enables the SC to establish a peacekeeping force, 
which can be seen as an “international police action”.61 The practice of entrusting 
the Secretary-General with command over the troops has its foundation in article 
98 UNC, which enables the SG to perform all the functions the Security Council 
deems advisable to delegate to him.62 
Whether one holds that peacekeeping actions can be traced back to article 
42, or that an unwritten rule has been formed, the substance does not change; 
either way there must be a SC resolution which constitutes the direct legal basis 
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for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation.63 It is only the legal basis for 
such a SC resolution which is the subject of dispute. 
Generally and especially in the years since 1993, there has been the 
development of deploying UN peacekeeping operations with mandates under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and into situations where fighting is still 
ongoing.64 
In November 2000, by passing resolution no. 1327, the Security Council laid 
down some general “decisions and recommendations” on the establishment and 
behaviour of peacekeeping operations, in order to give them “clear, credible and 
achievable mandates” and “a credible deterrent capability”.65 However, resolution 
1327 was not passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and therefore has no 
binding effect. In part II of the Annex to this resolution, the Security Council 
emphasized that the rules of engagement for UN peacekeeping forces should be 
fully consistent with “any relevant Security Council resolution” and should 
“clearly set out the circumstances in which force may be used to protect all 
mission components and personnel”.66  
The rules of engagement are written orders that must be developed and 
approved by both the parties involved and the Security Council and which are 
intended to establish the conditions under which the forces can use their weapons 
as they carry out peacekeeping missions.67 Rules of engagement have a two-way 
function; they are meant to provide a set of guidelines for the commander and his 
troops, and to ensure the consistency of the military operation with policy 
objectives.68 
As was mentioned earlier, peacekeeping operations are established on the 
basis of a Security Council Resolution and they can assume the status of 
subsidiary organs of the United Nations.69 Consequently the law applicable to the 
UN as a legal entity also applies to the peacekeeping forces.70 Some of the 
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important results of this determination are that the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the UN,71 and general customary rules of international law 
concerning liability apply to the peacekeepers. Although the United Nations as 
such is not a party to any of the conventions relating to the law of war, the 
“principles and spirit” which they contain must nevertheless be observed by the 
peacekeeping forces, as these conventions codify customary international law, by 
which the United Nations are bound.72 
Finally, special agreements between the host state and the UN can exempt 
the troops from the jurisdiction of the host state, which guarantees a degree of 
independence but at the same time bears the danger of abetting peacekeepers’ 
misconduct.73 
5. Peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts 
In recent times, more and more peacekeeping missions have been 
established in intrastate, civil war conflicts in which the lines of hostility are not 
as neatly drawn as in the classic interstate dispute.74 Operating experience on the 
ground has shown that peacekeepers are more vulnerable to violence in civil war 
situations and there are several explanations for the difficulties which the 
peacekeeping troops see themselves confronted with.75  
The most obvious problem is that in intrastate conflicts, there is often a 
multitude of factions, each of which fights for its own agenda.76 Consequently, it 
is very difficult to obtain the consent of all the parties to the conflict and therefore 
the concept of uniform consent is barely workable in the civil war context.77 
Furthermore, it is almost impossible to maintain an impartial appearance, 
since the rebel groups in the conflict will tend to perceive the peacekeepers as 
biased intruders: The peacekeepers’ task is to contain violence and promote 
stability while in many cases the threat of violence and instability are the very 
tools used by rebel movements to force concessions from the government. By 
promoting the status quo, the peacekeepers in the first instance relieve the 
pressure on the challenged government and, logically, rebel groups are likely to 
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view the peacekeepers’ activity as preserving the domination of the government 
and status quo elites.78 
Finally, the principle of non-use of force had to be modified in intrastate 
conflicts where peacekeepers have come under assault in the course of hostile 
reactions of the various factions to their presence.79 As a result, the respective 
troops have often been equipped with heavier weaponry.80 
Altogether, civil war situations pose some severe new threats to 
peacekeepers and have therefore necessitated further adjustment of the basic 
principles of UN peacekeeping.81 
6. Conclusion 
The UN peacekeeping role has expanded over the years, but it still relies on 
the Hammerskjöld principles that were established as a matter of practice in the 
early UN peacekeeping missions: impartiality, consent of the parties to the 
conflict and the prohibition of the use of force other than in self defence. 
Nevertheless, peacekeepers in recent operations (especially in civil law conflicts) 
are confronted with a multitude of new dangers and problems, which necessitate a 
continuous advancement of those principles. 
B. AU peacekeeping and peace enforcement laws 
Since the African Union (AU) was launched as recently as 2002, it is 
necessary to take into account the peacekeeping approach of its predecessor, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), in order to understand AU peacekeeping 
principles. So, besides discussing the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the 
AU, which currently govern peacekeeping operations, this part will also deal with 
the peacekeeping missions established by the OAU. Furthermore, this section will 
include an assessment of the relationship between the AU and the UN in terms of 
issues touching on international peace and security. 
1. Peacekeeping principles of the Organization of African Unity 
In the early 1960s, Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, who had 
a significant influence on the founding of the OAU, proposed that a collective 
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defence structure be included in its charter.82 However, when the organization was 
founded in 1963, the OAU charter only contained loose provisions concerning the 
security structure to be adopted on the continent.83 Like the UN Charter, its OAU 
counterpart made no provision for peacekeeping and, what is more, the Charter 
was very conservative on the internal affairs of member states: major emphasis 
lay on the autonomy of members from interference or coercion by other member 
states or by the organization as a whole.84 This adherence to the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity seriously limited the OAU’s role in internal 
conflicts.85 A further obstacle was created by the OAU’s lack of independent 
executive tools capable of enforcing sanctions against members and non-
members; its resolutions were only advisory and therefore OAU mediation was 
limited to persuasion.86  
Accordingly, it was no surprise that the OAU peacekeeping forces found 
themselves confronted with a multitude of problems.87 When the first major 
peacekeeping operation was established in Chad in 1981, serious obstacles stood 
in its way: There was no cease-fire agreement in Chad when the troops were 
deployed and therefore there was no peace to keep.88 In addition operational 
problems arose, such as an inadequate troop strength, poor coordination, 
communication and logistical problems.89 Furthermore, the missions mandate was 
given different interpretations by the different parties to the conflict, putting at 
risk the neutral stance of the force and thereby further complicating the 
operation’s task.90 
Aside from the conflict in Chad, the OAU missed some opportunities to 
resolve regional disputes, such as the conflict in Western Sahara in the late 1970s 
and the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977.91 In other conflicts there was 
a high level of foreign, especially superpower intervention, which fuelled these 
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conflicts and made it virtually impossible for the OAU to intervene or mediate 
successfully in the respective disputes.92 
In summary, one can say that OAU peacekeeping experience was very 
scarce, while the major effort in Chad was unsuccessful.93 
2. Effect of the transformation of the OAU into the AU 
In 2002, the AU was launched and the provisions in its Constitutive Act 
concerning peace and security radically departed from those of the OAU Charter: 
Unlike its OAU counterpart, the AU Act contains express provisions mandating it 
to deal with issues of human rights, peace and security in member states.94  
These provisions of the AU Act which are relevant for peacekeeping can be 
found in articles 3 (f) and 4 (j), determining that the AU shall “promote peace, 
security and stability on the continent”95 and providing for the right of any 
member state of the AU to “request intervention from the [AU] in order to restore 
peace and security”.96 At first sight, article 4 (g) of the AU Act seems to 
contradict these purposes, since it states that the AU shall function according to 
the principle of “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of 
another”.97 However, it is argued that article 4 (g) only restrains individual states 
from intervening, but not the AU as such. An additional argument is that human 
right issues do not fall within the description of “internal affairs”.98 
Article 4 (h) is another important provision of the AU Act and it gives the 
AU Assembly the “right to intervene in a member state […] in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.99 
Consequently the Assembly has the discretion to decide whether or not to 
intervene, while the host state’s consent is not required.100 
Also in 2002, after the AU had been launched, its members established a 
Peace and Security Council, which was intended to be a body that could anticipate 
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and pre-empt armed conflicts.101 In the case of existing conflicts, it is the 
responsibility of the Council to ”undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding 
functions for the resolution of these conflicts”.102 The council, consisting of 15 
elected members,103 is meant to function continuously104 and there is a plan to 
allocate it an African Standby Force, “composed of standby multidisciplinary 
contingents” and “ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice”.105  
The functions of the Peace and Security Council shall include intervention, 
pursuant to article 4 (h) of the AU Act.106 Article 4 (h), as was mentioned 
above,107 mandates the AU Assembly to take the decision to intervene in a 
member state; it is the Peace and Security Council’s responsibility to make 
recommendations to that effect.108 
However, a serious obstacle in the way of effective AU peacekeeping is set 
up by the financial provisions of the AU Act, a problem which I will return to in 
connection with the AMIS mission of the AU in Darfur.109  
3. AU peacekeeping missions 
After the President of Burundi, Francois Ndadaye, had been assassinated in 
1993, the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi and two 
subsequent ceasefire agreements were signed in August 2000 and in October and 
December 2002, marking the end of peace processes.110 In April 2003, the African 
Union accepted the challenge to establish the African Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB), the first AU peacekeeping operation.111 AMIB was a holding mission, 
pending the deployment of an UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping 
force, and it clearly helped to create conditions suitable for the establishment of 
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that UN mission (ONUB).112 However, generally speaking, AMIB’s contribution 
to political and economical stability was limited; it “cannot be said to have fully 
facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, nor was it able to fully 
ensure that the defence and security situation in Burundi was stable and well 
managed”.113 It has been argued that a major lesson which should be learned from 
the experiences of AMIB is that the “division of responsibilities between regional 
forces and UN presence should be formalised” in order to achieve better 
collaboration.114 Furthermore it has been suggested that the “conduct of regional 
peace operations should be based on standardised doctrine and operating 
procedures and not those of the individual troop-contributing countries”.115 
In addition to its AMIB mission, the African Union established the Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) and the recent Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which was 
created in early 2007 with the approval of the UN Security Council and which is 
planned to consist of up to 8000 troops.116 Whereas it is too early for an 
assessment of AMISOM, I will focus on the African Union Mission in Sudan and 
its transition into UNAMID in Chapter III. 
4. Relationship between AU and UN in relation to peace and security issues 
According to article 24 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has 
“primary responsibility” concerning the maintenance of international peace and 
security and in exercising this responsibility it has a mandate to supervise the AU, 
which is a regional arrangement in the sense of article 52 of the UN Charter.117 In 
other words, this means that articles 52 et seq constrain all activities of the AU in 
relation to the use of force, unless such actions are authorised by the UN Security 
Council.118 However, as was discussed above, article 4 (h) of the AU Act 
mandates the AU to intervene and it does not mention the requirement of seeking 
prior authorisation by the UN Security Council.119 Therefore it seems as if the AU 
Act does not anticipate the supervision of the UN SC in relation to intervening in 
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AU member states.120 It was argued that the omission in article 4 (h) of the AU 
Act was intentional, following the concern that UN bureaucratic procedures 
would hinder a quick response in cases of severe human rights violations.121 
However, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU122 does not seem to support this assumption.123 In its Preamble, 
it acknowledges the “provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring 
to the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security”124 and it also provides that the Peace and Security Council of 
the AU shall be guided, inter alia, by the principles of the UN Charter.125 
Therefore it may be argued that the Protocol aims to clarify the relationship 
between AU and UN and is intended to emphasize that the AU will not intervene 
militarily in member states without the approval of the UN Security Council.126 
Yet again article 16 (1) of the Protocol states that the AU “has the primary 
responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa”, which leads 
to the conclusion that the Preamble confers to the Security Council primacy only 
in relation to peace and security in the rest of the world, outside Africa.127 A 
strong indication for the accuracy of this point of view is the fact that the Protocol 
refrains from providing that the AU Peace and Security Council or the AU 
Assembly require the authorisation of the UN SC before intervening in a member 
state pursuant to article 4 (h) of the AU Act. 
Therefore neither the AU Act nor the Protocol Relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council reveal the intended relation between AU and 
UN, but it seems likely that the AU will not hesitate to intervene in a member 
state without obtaining prior authorisation of the UN Security Council, if it deems 
immediate action necessary to respond to a severe crisis. 
5. Conclusion 
Whereas the OAU Charter contained no express provisions mandating it to 
deal with issues of peace and security in member states, the AU Act has filled that 
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gap and explicitly enables the African Union to intervene in a member state in 
respect of grave circumstances.128 So while OAU peacekeeping efforts were 
scarce and for the most part unsuccessful, the prospects for AU peacekeeping are 
quite good, provided that the normative and institutional structure of the AU Act 
is backed by efficient norm enforcement approaches.129 
The AU Act does not define the relationship between the AU and the UN 
with regard to issues touching on international peace and security and it has been 
argued that the AU, in spite of article 24 UNC in conjunction with Chapter 8 of 
the UN Charter, assume primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and 
stability in Africa.130 
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Chapter II: Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 
A. Introduction 
Due to the many issues which are involved, the interpretation of treaty 
provisions or other legal texts, including resolutions of the Security Council, is a 
very contentious topic in international law.131 The exigence of interpretation arises 
in consequence of the indeterminacy of language used in a resolution or treaty,132 
or because of the fact that political differences between the negotiating parties 
necessitated a compromise solution.133 Of course it is also possible that the 
drafters simply overlooked an ambiguity in the respective document,134 and 
finally a legal text may also become unclear as a result of social, political or 
technological changes in the operating sphere of that text.135  
Whenever uncertainties arise over the meaning of a particular provision, it 
seems appropriate to identify the intentions of the parties who drafted the 
provision.136 In this respect, the difficulty intrinsic to the interpretation of 
multilateral treaties or Security Council resolutions lies in the plurality of the 
parties involved.137 There are different opinions on where to find evidence of the 
parties’ intentions and accordingly, there are several schools of thought on treaty 
interpretation.138 After the delineation of these differing theories (B.), I will turn 
to the specific problems associated with the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions (C.). 
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B. Main theories on treaty interpretation 
1. Textual, subjective and teleological approach 
There are three main schools of thought; the textual, the subjective and the 
teleological theory.139 The three opinions are characterized by their different ways 
of taking into account the contracting parties’ intentions: Whereas the textual 
school presumes that the text of a treaty adequately expresses these intentions,140 
the subjective school pays closer attention to what the parties intended to achieve 
in drafting the treaty.141 Under the teleological approach however, the treaty is 
assumed to have an overriding object and purpose which prevails over the 
intentions held by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.142  
Pursuant to the textual approach, effect must be given to the plain terms of 
the provisions, analysing the text in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the 
words employed.143 The ICJ, in the Admission of a State to the United Nations 
Case,144 supported this approach and held that  
the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions 
of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and 
ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.145 
It went on to state that only where the “words in their natural and ordinary 
meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result”, the court is forced to 
apply other methods of interpretation, in order to ascertain “what the parties really 
did mean when they used these words”.146 
The subjective theory adopts the classical view on interpretation and tries to 
detect what the parties actually intended.147 In order to be able to do so, the 
interpreter would have to consider the historical background and the 
circumstances in which the treaty was signed.148 Therefore the interpreter must, 
according to this theory, refer to the travaux préparatoires of a treaty, such as the 
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minutes of conferences and treaty drafts.149 Another aid in the interpretative 
process is recourse to the subsequent conduct in applying the treaty.  
Finally, the teleological school places emphasis on the object and purpose of 
a treaty and consequently, the supporters of that theory try to ascertain the 
interpretation which best serves that purpose.150 This opinion is particularly 
relevant for the interpretation of multilateral conventions of a general nature, such 
as the UN Charter.151 
According to the teleological approach, the general aim of a treaty even 
prevails over the intentions of the parties held at the time of drafting that treaty, 
thus under this approach the effective functioning of an organization outweighs 
the sovereignty of its members.152 This result emanates from the principle of 
effective interpretation, expressed in the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat – “it 
is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void”.153 
2. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Furthermore it is necessary to highlight the impact which the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),154 adopted in 1969 and entered into 
force in 1980, has on treaty interpretation. 
The Convention has been described as an “important instrument”155 and “a 
compound of codification and of progressive development of customary 
international law”.156 The ICJ has held on several occasions that the rules on 
interpretation contained in the Convention amount to customary international 
law.157 However, the Convention does not single out and codify one of the 
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approaches, but rather provides for a mixture of all three.158 In the first paragraph 
of article 31 it states that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose”.159 The second paragraph of article 31 
stipulates that the context  
[...] shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.160 
Finally article 32 permits recourse to the travaux préparatoires if the 
meaning cannot be established using the means provided by article 31.161 
In conclusion, although one must, according to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, first look at the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, 
none of the theories is exclusively the correct one.162 
C. Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 
There is little authority on the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions.163 The main question arising in this regard is whether or not the 
resolutions should be treated the same way as treaties in terms of interpretation. 
So first of all it is necessary to assess whether resolutions are comparable to 
treaties regarding the way they should be interpreted. I will argue that they should 
be treated in a different way than treaties. Therefore the subsequent step must then 
be to establish a set of guidelines on how Security Council resolutions should be 
interpreted. 
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1. Comparability of treaties and Security Council resolutions 
Security Council resolutions are neither legislation nor judgments or quasi-
judgments,164 nor are they treaties.165 In order to figure out to what extent, if any, 
the rules on the interpretation of treaties can be applied to Security Council 
resolutions, their respective affinities and disparities must be examined.  
As for their similarity, it has been stated that both treaty and resolution 
represent a meeting of wills, “a coming-together of the (possibly opposing) 
aspirations of the States whose representatives have negotiated its drafting”.166  
On the other hand, there are quite a number of discrepancies between 
treaties and SC resolutions: Unlike treaties most SC resolutions are not intended 
to have an external legal effect, that is, to create rights and obligations binding on 
States.167 In contrast to a multilateral treaty, a SC resolution is notionally a 
unilateral act, it does not have parties in the sense a treaty does; it is “an assertion 
of the will of the [Security Council], or a statement of its collective view of the 
situation”.168 Another difference lies in the fact that SC resolutions are often not 
self-contained, that is, they refer to and incorporate by reference other 
documents.169 Furthermore, while treaties do not create rights or obligations for a 
third party without that party’s consent,170 SC resolutions may provide for 
obligations which are incumbent upon member states by virtue of article 25 UNC, 
regardless of the consent of those member state.171 Finally, SC resolutions are 
often not drafted in clear, simple, concise and unambiguous language.172 Although 
it may be argued that the same is frequently true for treaties, there is still a 
considerable difference, since SC resolutions are often drafted by non-lawyers 
under strong political pressure and pressing deadlines and impelled by the need to 
find a compromise solution with regard to antithetic interests.173 The Security 
Council is a political organ,174 and the prerequisite for the use of clear language is 
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that the policy is clear, which naturally is rarely the case.175 Consequently, the 
ambiguous and indistinct wording which is likely to be found in SC resolutions, in 
conjunction with the other differences between treaties and resolutions, 
necessitates a different approach to interpretation than the one used for treaties. 
2. Subject of interpretation 
In order to establish guidelines for an appropriate interpretation of SC 
resolutions, it is first of all crucial to have a clear idea about the nature of the 
terms within a resolution which need to be interpreted. Furthermore it is 
significant to know who is vested with the right to give an authentic interpretation 
of a SC resolution. 
SC resolutions are not all of the same kind; a broad distinction may be 
drawn between provisions of resolutions which take the form of recommendations 
and those that are mandatory and impose obligations on third parties.176 
Provisions which only have an effect internal to the United Nations legal order or 
to the Security Council itself, such as recommendations concerning UN 
membership or the amendment of the Council’s Provisional Rules of 
Procedure,177 are not of great interest for our purpose and therefore will not be 
dealt with. When the Council intends a provision to be mandatory, it usually – but 
not consistently – includes in the resolution an article 39 (of the UN Charter) 
determination, and uses the words “acting under Chapter VII”.178 Although there 
are no formal requirements for SC resolutions, they usually contain unnumbered 
preambular, and numbered operative paragraphs.179 The preambular paragraphs, 
by giving guidance as to the object and purpose of the resolution, may assist in 
interpretation, but they might actually be misleading, since often they contain 
proposals whose integration into the operative paragraphs could not be agreed 
on.180 
Since in many cases resolutions are not self-contained and refer to other 
documents, these documents also need to be taken into account when interpreting 
the provisions of the resolution.181 The same is true for other resolutions to which 
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the object of interpretation refers, because often SC resolutions are “part of a 
series and it is only possible to understand them as such.”182 
When interpreting SC resolutions, it needs to be kept in mind that “only the 
Security Council, or some body authorized to do so by the Council, may give an 
authentic interpretation in the true sense”.183 The Permanent Court of Justice 
stated in its Jaworzina Advisory Opinion,184 that “it is an established principle that 
the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to 
the person or body who has the power to modify or suppress it.”185 
For the purposes of this paper the role of subsidiary organs of the Council – 
to be more precise: of peacekeeping forces – deserves particular attention. 
Peacekeeping missions can be established as subsidiary organs of the Council,186 
but in order to give an authentic interpretation, they must be expressly vested with 
the respective power by the Council.187 
3. Authority for the interpretation 
It should be reiterated that the question of the interpretation of SC 
resolutions has failed to attract much scholarly interest and there are very few 
decisions of international adjudicative bodies in this regard.188 The principal 
judicial authority is drawn from from a short passage in the Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ in the Namibia case, which is of limited relevance because the Court did 
not necessarily make a general statement about the interpretation of SC 
resolutions, but rather was dealing with the question of binding force of the 
resolutions.189 In the Namibia case, the ICJ stressed four points of reference for 
the interpretation of SC resolutions: “the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, 
the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all 
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the 
resolution of Security Council”.190 The ICJ made no reference to the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.191 Thereby it seems to endorse the 
aforementioned conclusion that the interpretation of SC resolutions should not be 
governed by the rules laid down in the VCLT.192 
4. Method of interpretation 
SC resolutions differ from treaties and should not be interpreted in the same 
way,193 but nevertheless the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can be 
used as a starting point.194 As was pointed out already, the Vienna Convention 
would suggest interpreting the resolution “in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”.195 
It has already been indicated that SC resolutions frequently contain 
indistinct language, and therefore it would be inappropriate to approach the text as 
if it was adopted with the care and legal input of a treaty.196 Nevertheless, an 
interpreter will logically start to look at the ordinary meaning of the terms, 
ascertaining what the members of the SC collectively decided to include in the 
text of the resolution.197  
The next step must be to take into account the context of the resolution.198 
The Vienna Convention does not offer much help in finding out about the context, 
as article 31 (2) VCLT mainly refers to the parties (of a treaty). As already 
mentioned, a SC resolution does not have parties in the sense a treaty does, there 
is only the Council itself.199 However, a safe assumption is that recourse must be 
taken to the whole text of the resolution as well as to its preamble and, if existent, 
any annexes.200 Logically, the context of a resolution also comprises of all the 
prior and subsequent resolutions which were adopted in relation to the subject 
matter in question.201 
Finally article 31 (1) VCLT proposes that a treaty shall be interpreted in the 
light of its object and purpose. SC resolutions which are relevant in terms of the 
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establishment of peacekeeping missions most often deal with a particular situation 
or dispute.202 In such cases it is important to know the political background and to 
also take a close look at the exact circumstances of the Security Council’s 
involvement.203 Therefore it is crucial to take into account the object and purpose 
of the respective resolution, which emanates from the circumstances of the 
Council’s involvement and the political background.204 Most important in this 
regard are the background documents, such as reports of the Secretary-General, 
letters requesting the holding of a meeting and statements made by Council 
members in the Security Council before and after the adoption of the resolution.205 
Subsequent resolutions or other formal acts by the Council regarding the 
interpretation or application of the resolution may also be helpful.206 Finally, any 
interpretation should be in light of the purpose of the maintenance of international 
peace and security, since this is the fundamental purpose of the Security 
Council.207 
As far as article 32 VCLT permits recourse to supplementary means, it does 
not provide much help to gain new cognition, since all the preparatory work and 
the circumstances of the adoption of a resolution “are likely to have been fully 
examined in the search for the context and object and purpose.”208 
D. Proposal for the interpretation of SC resolutions 
Both customary and treaty law apply a composition of different doctrinal 
schools of thought to treaty interpretation, namely the textual, the teleological and 
the subjective approach.209 The interpretation of SC resolutions is even more 
uncertain, but due to their disparities, they need to be interpreted in a different 
way than treaties.210 The tools for interpretation which are provided by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are helpful only in part. Less importance 
should be attached to the minutiae of language, while much more attention must 
be paid to the circumstances of the adoption.211 
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To summarize, an interpreter of SC resolutions should start by examining 
the provisions in the respective resolution, ascertaining what the members of the 
SC collectively decided to state in the text.212 The context has to be taken into 
account as well as the institutional framework and fundamental purpose of the 
Security Council: the maintenance of peace and security.213 Finally, recourse must 
be taken to the object and purpose of the resolution, examining prior and 
subsequent resolutions and other documents referred to as well as the political 
circumstances surrounding the drafting process.214 
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Chapter III: History of the conflict in Darfur 
A. Introduction 
In order to determinate the extent of the UNAMID mandate, it is necessary 
to have background knowledge of the Darfur conflict, the role of the UN, AU, the 
government of Sudan and of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of SC 
resolution 1769. 
The current conflict in the Darfur Region dates back to 2003. In order to 
understand its occurrence, it is crucial to know the geographical, political and 
ethnic circumstances of that region. So I will first of all describe the background 
of the conflict (B), before giving an outline of the history of the conflict since 
2003 (C). Subsequent to this I will assess the position of the Sudanese 
Government as well as the role of both the United Nations and the African Union 
(D). Finally I will illustrate the development which led to the acceptance of a 
revised plan for a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force by Sudan (E). 
B. Geographical, political and ethnic premises in the Darfur region 
The Darfur region is located in the western part of Sudan, bordering Libya 
and Chad.215 Sudan is Africa’s largest country and Darfur alone is the size of 
France.216 Darfur is largely an arid plateau with the volcanic peaks of the Marrah 
Mountains in the center of the region.217 While the eastern half of the Darfur 
region is covered with plains and low hills of sandy soils, western Darfur is 
dominated by basement rock, in some places covered with a thin layer of sandy 
soil, too infertile to be farmed.218 Within living memory, the inhabitants of these 
semi-desert and desert areas have always competed for the scarce resources like 
water, feedlots, farmland, firewood and building materials.219 The line of 
confrontation is to be found between the herders who are mostly of Arab origin 
and the mostly black African farmers of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa 
peoples.220 These ethnic tensions were fuelled by an ideology of Arab supremacy 
propagated by Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, while at the same time the 
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proxy wars between Sudan, Libya and Chad increased the instability in the 
region.221  
Economically, the Sudan is an Arab-dominated country, while the 
population of Darfur is mostly black African.222 The Sudanese government was 
blamed by opposition groups in Darfur for discriminating against the black 
Africans of the region.223 Unlike in the second Sudanese civil war, where one side 
of the conflict was composed of the primarily Muslim north and the other side 
comprised the Christian and Animist south, almost all of the combatants and 
victims in Darfur are Muslim.  
For decades, the central government in Khartoum has disregarded the 
remote Darfur region, which resulted in increasing poverty and growing anger, 
especially amongst the disadvantaged black Darfurians, whose leaders accused 
Khartoum of systematically expelling them.224  
When the rains failed in 1983 and 84 and a famine hit the region, an 
estimated 95.000 Darfurians lost their lives. The famine perished social structures 
and resulted in the first significant fighting amongst Darfurians, that was followed 
by a low level conflict which continued for the next 15 years.225 During that time, 
the Sudanese government began to arm Arab militias and relied on them to 
repress their enemies.226 A rapid growth of population, periodic droughts and the 
increasing desertification of farmland further deteriorated the situation.227  
In January 2003, the tensions gave rise to an armed uprising.228 Rebels 
attacked police stations, army outposts and military convoys, and the government 
engaged in a massive air and land assault on the rebel stronghold in the Marrah 
Mountains.229 In Darfur there are different rebel groups, notably the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 
which is much smaller than the SLM.230  
The other side of the armed conflict that erupted in 2003 is composed of the 
Sudanese military and the Janjaweed, a militia group consisting mostly of Arab 
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camel herding nomads from the Baggara tribes.231 The Khartoum government 
which is behind the Sudanese military consists mainly of the Islamist National 
Islamic Front (NIF) regime which came to power in a military coup in 1989.232 
Ever since the 2003 emergence of the large scale armed conflict, human 
rights organizations have repeatedly reported on what they called ethnic cleansing 
and stealthy genocide.233 The Sudanese government has always rejected the 
allegations.234 The following passage aims at describing the various peace 
agreements and their surrounding circumstances as well as the developments 
which led to the deployment of UNAMID. The peace deals, as I will argue in 
chapter IV, play a crucial role for the interpretation of the SC resolution and other 
documents which established UNAMID. 
C. History of the conflict since 2003 
1. The starting point 
During the weeks following 26 February 2003, the SLM rebels launched a 
series of successful attacks on the army headquarters in the Marrah Mountains 
district and the Sudanese army had little in reserve to respond to the attacks.235 
The army was already busy fighting in eastern Sudan, where rebels threatened the 
newly constructed pipeline from the central oilfields to Port Sudan, and in the 
south in the Second Sudanese Civil War, it seemed likely that the government 
would lose the whole of Darfur.236 The Sudanese Army was not trained in desert 
warfare and the rebels’ hit-and-run tactics proved devastatingly effective, 
therefore the Sudanese Army lost almost every encounter.237 
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2. Alteration of the government strategy: Janjaweed militias 
The government had already used Janjaweed militias in the Nuba mountains 
in the early 1990s and in the oilfields of Southern Sudan starting in 1998.238 The 
Janjaweed militias were recruited from Arab Baggara herders and they were now 
upgraded to a full paramilitary fighting force, with new arms, some artillery, and 
military advisors.239 The probable outcome of such a strategy was predictable, 
since the previous use of Janjaweed militias had resulted in forced displacements 
and massive human rights violations.240 
In June 2003 there were recruitment drives all over the Darfur region, both 
for the army and for the Janjaweed and always on a tribal basis: “The government 
gave weapons to the Arab youths and sent the [others] away.”241 So the new army 
rejected the black African youths, who were traditionally its mainstay, but 
nevertheless it accepted some criminals, who were released from prisons and 
mandated to organize Janjaweed forces in West Darfur.242 Not surprisingly, the 
Janjaweed were said to be defined by their “unbound criminality”; They “stole, 
burned, mutilated, killed and raped – subjecting tiny communities to unimaginable 
horrors”.243 
The better-equipped Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand and it is 
argued that the official army and the unofficial Janjaweed became 
indistinguishable.244 The Janjaweed were supplied and accompanied by the army, 
which often surrounded villages as the Janjaweed attacked.245 By March 2004, 
several thousand non-Arab Africans had been killed and a million had been driven 
away from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region.246 A 
United Nations observer team reported that the Janjaweed militias singled out 
non-Arab villages and left untouched Arab villages that were sometimes as close 
as 500 meters to an attacked village.247 
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When refugees started to pour into neighbouring Chad, the crisis took on an 
international dimension.248 Janjaweed militiamen pursued the refugees and 
clashed with Chadian government forces along the border.249 At the same time, 
United Nations coordinator for Sudan Mukesh Kapila described the situation in 
Darfur as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world and the United Nations called 
for a ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebels.250 
3. The 2004 ceasefire agreement and the establishment of AMIS 
In April 2004, negotiations between the Sudanese government, the SLM and 
the JEM resulted in the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, in which the 
parties stipulated to guarantee free passage for humanitarian aid, to free prisoners 
of war and to disarm militias.251 However, a group splintered from the JEM and 
this “National Movement for Reform and Development” did not participate in the 
ceasefire agreement.252 The African Union sent a Ceasefire Commission to 
monitor observance of the agreement, but nevertheless, the Janjaweed and rebel 
attacks continued.253 
The ongoing atrocities led to further United Nations warnings of the risk of 
genocide, and the US threatened measures against the Sudanese government if it 
refused to disarm the Janjaweed militias and protect civilians.254 However, these 
threats had little effect since some members of the United Nations Security 
Council, including China, which has a veto, opposed such measures.255 
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In May 2004, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group reported that 
over 350,000 people could potentially die as a result of starvation and disease and 
comparisons were drawn to the ethnic cleansing used in the Yugoslav wars.256 
In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops to protect the 
AU-ceasefire monitors, but it soon became apparent that the small AMIS (African 
Union Mission in Sudan) force could not provide much help.257 So another 150 
Nigerian troops were sent, then another 600 in April 2005 and in July 2005, the 
force was increased to about 7000 troops.258 
Despite repeated international calls for the Sudanese government to abandon 
the atrocities, talks between the government and the rebel groups went slowly and 
finally were deadlocked.259  
In January 2005, when the Sudanese government signed a peace deal with 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan to end the 
21-year war in the south, rebels in Darfur accused the government of redeploying 
its soldiers to Darfur in order to solve the conflict militarily.260  
In December 2005, an attack on a Chadian town near the Sudanese border 
led to the deaths of three hundred rebels.261 Sudan was blamed for the attack 
which was the second in the region in three days and in response, the government 
of Chad declared its hostility toward Sudan.262 The violence triggered Libyan 
efforts to mediate between the two neighbouring countries and eventually Chadian 
President Déby, Sudanese President al-Bashir and Libyan Leader al-Quaddafi 
signed the Tripoli Agreement on 8 February, 2006, which was aimed at ending the 
Sudanese-Chadian border conflict.263 
4. May Agreement (2006) and renewed fighting 
The Darfur Peace Negotiations, which eventually resulted in another peace 
deal between the Sudanese government and a faction of the SLM, had already 
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started in Abuja in December 2004.264 The rebels asked for re-aggregation of the 
three Darfur provinces, for a Vice-Presidential position, for control of the united 
regional government and for significant compensation for the displaced persons 
who had lost everything since 2003.265 The “peace agreement” which the 
Sudanese government offered was said to be incomplete and falsely generous, but 
since the international community seemed to overestimate the effect such an 
agreement could have in terms of a durable pacification of the region, the rebels 
were confronted with growing pressure to sign it.266 
On 5 May 2006, Minnie Minnawi, who represented a faction of the SLM, 
gave in and signed the “Darfur Peace Agreement”.267 The agreement contained 
security arrangements as well as power- and wealth-sharing provisions; it called 
for the disarmament of the Janjaweed and for the rebel forces to disband and be 
incorporated into the army.268  
However, since the accord was rejected by the JEM and another faction of 
the SLM,269 things went horribly wrong right from the beginning.270 The 
Janjaweed renewed their attacks just hours after the signing; fighting resumed on 
the Chadian border and major international aid organizations considered leaving 
Darfur due to attacks against their personnel.271 Also despite the May Agreement, 
the efforts of the Sudanese government to end the violence in the region remained 
poor and a top UN envoy to Sudan stated that human rights abuses had continued 
with impunity in Darfur.272 
All these circumstances made United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan 
call for bringing a United Nations peacekeeping force of 18,600 troops to the 
region in order to replace the African Union peacekeepers.273 This plan was 
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strongly opposed by the Sudanese government and President Omar el-Bashir, who 
vowed to never allow a UN force into Darfur.274  
5. UNSC Resolution and Sudanese reaction 
On 31 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 
1706, which implicitly recognised the inability of the African Union force to 
handle the situation in Darfur275 and called for 20,600 UN troops and police 
officers to support the 7,000-member AU force.276 Although the Security Council 
acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized UNMIS277 to use “all 
necessary means”, it nevertheless invited the consent of the Sudanese Government 
of National Unity for that deployment.278 
The Sudanese government did not only express strong opposition to the 
resolution, it also launched a major offensive in Darfur the very next day.279 On 5 
September 2006, Khartoum asked the AU force to leave Darfur by the end of the 
month and added that they had “no right to transfer this assignment to the United 
Nations or any other party. This right rest[ed] with the government of Sudan”.280 
6. Deterioration of the situation 
Since the Sudanese government remained sternly against the UN 
peacekeeping force, the plans for its deployment were indefinitely suspended, but 
the AU announced the extension of its presence until 31 December 2006.281 The 
AU forces were reinforced by two hundred UN troops and collaterally on 6 
October 2006, the UN Security Counsel voted to extend the UNMIS mandate 
until 30 April 2007.282 
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Although the Nigerian President and the Nigerian Foreign Minister urged 
Khartoum to accept the UN force plan283 and the US President imposed further 
sanctions against Sudan,284 the government in Khartoum continued to oppose the 
“colonial” plan that would turn Sudan “into another Iraq”.285 
In October 2006, the Sudanese government signed a peace agreement with 
rebels in eastern Sudan, allowing Khartoum to relocate troops from the east to 
Darfur.286 Thereafter a deterioration of the situation in Darfur could be perceived, 
just as there had been an increase in violence after the Sudanese government 
redeployed soldiers from southern Sudan in January 2005, following the peace 
deal with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the south.287 
Despite renewed reports of a potential deal to place a “compromise 
peacekeeping force” in Darfur in November,288 the Sudanese government again 
rejected the plan and stated that “there should be no talk of a mixed force”.289 
In December 2006, Darfur Arabs created their own rebel group, the Popular 
Forces Troops, and distanced themselves from the government’s position and 
from the Janjaweed, saying the militias consisted of “a minority of mercenaries 
and hired individuals [and did] not represent Darfur Arabs.”290  
At the same time, there was a sharp increase in violence in eastern Chad, 
with Chad accusing Sudan of sending Janjaweed militias across the border from 
Darfur.291 
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7. New ceasefire agreement 
In January 2007, the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced that his 
government and the rebel groups would cease hostilities for 60 days and work 
towards a lasting peace within that time.292 However, it was not clear exactly 
which rebel groups had agreed to it.293 Two weeks later, al Bashir admitted that 
government forces had been bombing northern areas of the Darfur region, while 
claiming that “the action did not breach [the] UN-brokered ceasefire” and that the 
government had “no option but to use its armed forces in response to attacks by 
rebel groups”.294 
On 15 April 2007 African Union peacekeepers were targeted and killed and 
the Sudanese government was accused of flying arms and heavy military 
equipment into Darfur and of painting Sudanese military planes white to disguise 
them as United Nations or African Union aircraft.295 
8. Attacks within Chad and the peace agreement between Sudan and Chad 
Even before the AU peacekeepers were killed, the conflict had spread over 
the border to Chad once again. On 31 March 2007, Janjaweed militias killed up to 
400 people in the eastern border region of Chad.296 More attacks followed in 
April, forcing up to 3000 villagers to flee their homes in south-eastern Chad.297 
Therefore Chad and Sudan once again accused each other of backing rebels 
hostile to their respective governments,298 but nevertheless they both signed a 
Saudi-brokered reconciliation deal in May 2007, in which they agreed to political, 
economic and social cooperation between their countries and pledged to respect 
each other's sovereignty and integrity and not to interfere in each other's internal 
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affairs or harbour opposition groups.299 They also promised to support AU and 
UN efforts to stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and neighboring border areas in 
eastern Chad.300 But at the same time doubts were expressed as to whether the 
promise would have any concrete impact unless it was accompanied by peace-
building initiatives on the ground in Darfur and eastern Chad.301 Since Sudan still 
resisted the deployment of a large UN peacekeeping force and Chad claimed to 
want civilian UN police instead of a robust military force in its violent east,302 the 
promises did not really improve the prospects for the region. 
9. Summary of the relevant peace agreements 
In conclusion, there was the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, 
signed by SLM, JEM and GoS while the National Movement for Reform and 
Development did not participate.303 It was followed by the deployment of an AU 
ceasefire commission and later of AMIS, but it could not halt the violence in 
Darfur.304 The Tripoli Agreement was concluded between Chad and Sudan on 8 
February 2006 and aimed at ending the Sudanese-Chadian border conflict.305 On 5 
May 2006 another Darfur peace deal was signed by a faction of the SLM and the 
GoS, but like the 2004 agreement it could not stop the Janjaweed and rebel 
attacks.306 In January 2007 a truce was announced by Sudanese President al-
Bashir, but it was never implemented.307 Finally, in May 2007, Chad and Sudan 
signed a reconciliation deal pledging political, economic and social 
cooperation.308 
D. Positions of the Sudanese Government, the UN and the AU 
The beginning of the crisis in Darfur in 2003 went almost unnoticed by the 
international media and only gained its interest in 2004, when NGOs began 
noticing Darfur.309 When the UN Human Rights Coordinator for Sudan gave an 
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interview to the UN’s own IRIN network in March 2004 and declared that Darfur 
was “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis”,310 newspapers took up the issue 
and the New York Times started writing about “genocide”.311 Nevertheless, the 
world at large was not very clear about which direction it wished to take 
concerning the complex crisis, which is rooted in ethnic and historical factors that 
few understood and which is devoid of any identifiable practical interest for the 
rich countries.312 
Knowledge of the positions taken by the Sudanese government, the United 
Nations and the African Union is crucial for understanding the background of the 
progression towards the acceptance of a revised plan for a joint UN-AU 
peacekeeping force and consequently for the understanding of the UNAMID 
mandate. Therefore the following paragraphs will discuss the conduct of 
Khartoum, the UN and the AU.   
1. The Sudanese government 
The attitude of the Sudanese government can be summed up in a statement 
of Najib al Kheir, the Sudanese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after the 
US government offered its mediation in April 2004 for at least facilitating 
humanitarian deliveries: “They have a right to propose and we have a right to 
decide. The [...] proposal does not conform to our vision, which considers that the 
conflict is a matter regarding only the sons of Darfur”.313 
All along the way Khartoum tried to diminish the dimension of the crisis, 
declaring itself a victim of foreign propaganda.314 The government did not hesitate 
to deliver the most unrealistic statements, as when in April 2004 Foreign Minister 
Mustafa Osman Ismail announced: “I can assure you that all those who have been 
killed, whether militia, rebels, soldiers or civilians caught in the fighting, do not 
reach one thousand”.315 
At times Khartoum pretended to be cooperating with the international 
demands and President Omar al Bashir would promise “unimpeded access” for 
humanitarian aid workers, but shortly after, “Refugees International” stated that 
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“there is absolutely no access to any place. Things are not changing and if they are 
[...], they are changing for the worse”.316 
When the Commission chairman of the African Union, Alpha Oumar 
Konaré, proposed to al Bashir the idea of an African inquiry into Darfur, Bashir 
rebuffed the AU and set up his own commission instead.317 Its report, released in 
January 2005, was said to be completely unbalanced; no suspected perpetrators of 
war crimes were named and no government culpability was admitted.318 This 
finding came shortly after Musa Hilal, a Janjaweed commander had asserted that 
he was only following government orders when attacking villages in Darfur.319 
Correspondingly, the Sudanese government was accused of taking this position of 
denial and refusal in order to gain time to create an irreversible situation.320 And 
there was one statement that Khartoum repeated over and over again: “We will 
not tolerate the presence of foreign troops, whatever their nationality”.321 
2. The United Nations 
The Security Council raised the issue of Darfur in May 2004,322 and ever 
since that date, the United Nation’s position was influenced by several 
setbacks.323 The UN were deeply involved in the peace process for southern 
Sudan, therefore Khartoum could play Darfur against the South.324 In addition, the 
Arab/Black African split that was implicit in the conflict had many echoes inside 
the UN, and furthermore it was an open secret that Kofi Annan and the UN were 
not US administration’s favourites and the US might make the world body take 
potentially false avenues.325 Finally Darfur is an exemplary demonstration of 
practical limitations arising from a crisis in which the heavyweight member states 
do not want to act.326 Proposals of a widened arms embargo to include the 
Sudanese army were rejected by Russia, which sold MiGs to Khartoum, and a ban 
on Sudanese oil exports was blocked by China, the biggest investor in Sudanese 
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oilfields.327 Consequently, although the UN carried over 60% of the financial 
burden of the humanitarian efforts, it became increasingly unable to do anything 
political about it as the crisis developed.328  
In June 2004, the Security Council passed Resolution 1556, which called for 
the disarming of the Janjaweed, the arrest of their leaders and unobstructed 
humanitarian access, and determined a deadline for the implementation of these 
stipulations.329 The deadline was ignored by Khartoum, and Sudanese officials 
even hinted that they would stall the peace process for southern Sudan if the world 
got tough on Darfur.330 
The Security Council then passed Resolution 1564, which mandated an 
international Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) to investigate human rights 
violations,331 but off the record everyone worried about naming the perpetrators of 
the Darfur war crimes, since these were the same people who were supposed to 
implement the peace deal with the SPLM in southern Sudan.332 
Therefore, when the AU appeared on the scene, the SC was more than happy 
to invoke the “Bahimi principle”, proposing that regional organizations take 
primary responsibility for the problems in their own backyards.333 
3. The African Union 
Darfur was the first major crisis to face the African Union since its 
transformation from the Organization of African Unity.334 Knowing that the world 
would judge the AU by its competence in conflict management, the Commission’s 
chairman Alpha Konaré and the AU chairman in 2004/05, President Obasanjo of 
Nigeria, were eager to act.335 But ever since the AU took up the file of Darfur, it 
faced financial problems, because the financial provisions under which the AU 
operated were highly unrealistic.336 Therefore the initial cost of a peacekeeping 
operation in Darfur had to be financed entirely by foreign donors, who were only 
too glad to do so in order to shift the responsibility to the AU.337 However, when 
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the African Union Mission in Sudan started in 2004 with its first 300 troops, the 
mandate of the force was restricted to protecting the 132 observers who had also 
been sent by the AU.338 Consequently, Gérard Prunier, a renowned analyst of East 
Africa, described the AMIS task as a “mission impossible”:  
“It was supposed to substitute itself to the coalition of the unwilling, to 
stop what it was only mandated to observe, to operate on a shoestring 
and to keep the pretence of serious international involvement for its 
tight-fisted sponsors. Predictably all it achieved was a token 
presence.”339   
E. Acceptance of a revised plan for a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force by 
Sudan 
Although the UN Security Council resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, 
which gave UNMIS a mandate for Darfur,340 was passed under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and conferred enforcement authority upon a deploying force,341 it 
explicitly guaranteed the Sudan’s national sovereignty and invited Khartoum to 
give its consent to strengthening the UNMIS force by 20,600 troops.342 The 
Sudanese government remained firm in its rejection of the plan, but it saw itself 
confronted with growing international pressure and tightened US sanctions.343  
In June 2007, after the AU and UN had revised their plans to circumvent the 
Sudanese objections, Khartoum finally gave in and vowed to accept the joint UN-
AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.344 The government of Sudan announced that it 
accepted the three-phased plan to bolster AMIS and transform it into UNAMID, 
which had already been adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council in 
November 2006, and by the UN Security Council in December 2006.345 The 
approach arranges for an amplification of the existing AMIS forces by a Light 
Support Package (LSP – first phase), a Heavy Support Package (HSP – second 
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phase), and a culmination in the AU/UN hybrid force (third phase).346 The LSP 
consisted of 187 military staff officers, police advisers and civilians and had, for 
the most part, been deployed as of the end of July 2007.347 The HSP, which was 
deployed during the second half of 2007, comprised a total of 4107 troops and 
finally UNAMID took over by the end of December 2007.348 
In August 2007 Alpha Konaré had already announced that African countries 
would provide all of the 26,000 peacekeepers to be sent to Darfur.349 
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Chapter IV: Extent of powers of the peacekeeping forces in Darfur 
As was explained above, the mandate of a UN peacekeeping force emanates, 
inter alia, from the Security Council resolution which forms the basis of that 
operation’s deployment. Likewise, UNAMID obtains its authorization from the 
Security Council resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007,350 in conjunction with other 
documents.351 Therefore, in order to understand the exact extent of the UNAMID 
mandate, it is necessary to examine these underlying documents. Before turning to 
the provisions relevant for determining the extent of the peacekeeper’s powers 
ratione loci (B) and ratione materiae (C), I will briefly outline and describe the 
key documents relating to the establishment of UNAMID and single out the ones 
of particular importance. 
A. The structure of UNAMID 
1. Relevant documents for the establishment of UNAMID   
Security Council resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 refers to a multitude of 
other documents, the most important of which for our purposes are (1) the report 
of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 
of 5 June 2007,352 (2) the Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006 and (3) the 
reports of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 and 23 February 2007.353  
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The report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African 
Union Commission provides the details of the mandate of UNAMID in its articles 
54 and 55 and consequently is of the utmost importance with regard to evaluating 
the extent of powers of the UNAMID peacekeepers.354 
The referral to the Darfur Peace Agreement might also be helpful in this 
respect, because it contains ceasefire and security arrangements that may help to 
clarify the scope of the peacekeepers’ mandate. 
Finally, the two reports of the Secretary-General are, inter alia, concerned 
with the improvement of the security situation in the neighbouring regions along 
the borders between the Sudan and Chad355 and therefore might assist in 
examining a possible crossborder competence into Chad. 
2. Structure and leadership 
UNAMID is an unprecedented AU/UN hybrid operation, which means that 
it also has a unique organisational and leadership structure. The details of the 
control structure and force administration envisaged under the UNAMID mandate 
can be found in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the SC resolution 1769, which for their part 
refer to other documents.356 
Paragraph 7 provides for unity of command and control and states that, in 
accordance with the basic principles of peacekeeping, a single chain of command 
will be established.357 It goes on to stipulate that “command and control structures 
and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations” and in this context it 
refers to the conclusions of the high level consultation on the situation in Darfur 
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of 16 November 2006.358 In practice this means that a joint AU-UN Special 
Representative (JSR), who reports to both the UN Secretary-General and the AU 
Commission Chairperson, is designated to lead UNAMID.359 The JSR receives 
directives from the AU Peace and Security Commissioner and the UN Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.360 The next link in the chain of 
command is the Force Commander of UNAMID, who reports to the JSR.361 
Paragraph 8 of the SC resolution 1769 regulates the personnel generation 
and administration and refers to the report of the Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, which in its 
paragraph 114 sets out that,  
[f]or unity of effort and efficiency, all United Nations and African Union personnel 
deployed to the operation will be administered in accordance with United Nations 
rules, regulations, policies, directives and administrative instructions, as well as 
standard operating procedures, including, but not limited to, those relating to 
performance, conduct and discipline.362 
3. General extent of powers 
UNAMID is a peacekeeping mission and as we have already seen,363 one of 
the most crucial questions with regard to the mandate of a peacekeeping force is 
whether the troops are merely on the ground to observe the implementation of a 
ceasefire agreement and, if their task exceeds mere observation, to what extent 
they may use force. As was outlined in chapter I, the traditional approach was a 
complete prohibition on the use of force other than in self-defence,364 but this 
strict point of view was abandoned in the course of the various UN peacekeeping 
missions, especially in intrastate conflicts.365 For UNAMID, the UN/AU report is 
quite distinct in this respect; it states in paragraph 71: “The operation’s military 
force must be capable and ready to deter violence, including in a pre-emptive 
manner.”366 This directive must be kept in mind for the detailed determination of 
UNAMID’s extent of powers ratione loci and ratione materiae. 
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B. Extent of powers ratione loci 
1. Introduction 
This section aims to critically evaluate all the relevant provisions in the 
various documents in order to establish the exact extent of UNAMID’s powers 
ratione loci, focussing especially on a potential cross-border competence into 
Chad. To assess the respective provisions, I will revert to all the conclusions 
which were drawn earlier in this thesis with regard to the general principles of 
peacekeeping operations and the interpretation of non-treaty documents. 
The examination on whether the peacekeepers are mandated to cross the 
Chadian border is of particular interest because throughout the Darfur conflict, 
refugees have fled across the border into Chad and they have been frequently 
pursued by their attackers.367 SC resolution 1769 authorises the peacekeeping 
forces to operate on Sudanese territory and the Sudanese government gave its 
consent to the presence of the UNAMID peacekeepers.368 As a basic principle, the 
forces have to respect the sovereignty of a third state, unless that state consented 
to operations on its territory.369 On the other hand, it has already been explained 
that a peacekeeping operation which is vested with Chapter VII authority, is 
hypothetically discharged of the requirement to obtain the consent of the 
respective state.370 
To draw a drastic picture which clarifies the issue at stake: how much help 
can be provided by a peacekeeper who is vested with a mandate that allows him to 
halt atrocities on the Sudanese side of the border with Chad, but at the same time 
disables him from interfering if the assailant moves a short distance over the 
border to continue to kill. 
2. Relevant provisions with regard to the mandate ratione loci 
In its para 1, SC resolution 1769 states that the mandate of UNAMID shall 
be “as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and 
the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007”.371 Among the 
enlisted competences in para 54 of this report, there are several provisions which 
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are relevant for the establishment of the extent of powers ratione loci; para 54 
mandates UNAMID to 
(b) contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of 
physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas 
of deployment, [...] 
(c) monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various 
ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the implementation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements [...] 
(h) monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan’s borders with Chad and 
the Central African Republic. 
Paragraph 15 of SC resolution 1769 vests UNAMID with Chapter VII 
authority to “take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces 
and as it deems within its capabilities in order to: 
(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the 
security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, 
(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, 
prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, 
without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. 
3. Extent of powers ratione loci 
Having determined the relevant provisions, the next step is to examine the 
extent of powers ratione loci and to assess whether or not these provisions furnish 
the peacekeepers with the competence to cross the border into Chad. 
Paragraph 54 (b) of the UN/AU report refers to the “areas of deployment” 
and thereby triggers the question of the exact area of deployment for UNAMID. 
SC resolution 1769 is silent with regard to this matter; it only authorises the 
establishment of UNAMID in “Darfur”.372 The report of the UN Secretary-
General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission also only mentions Darfur in 
general.373 However, the Darfur Peace Agreement of June 2006, which para 54 of 
the UN/AU report refers to, clarifies that the area of deployment excludes any 
Chadian border regions.374 Therefore the area of deployment is indeed confined to 
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Darfur; 500 km wide, from as far west as the Chadian border to as far east as 
eastern North Darfur.375 
a) Para 54 (h) report of the SG and the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
Paragraph 54 (h) of the report of the UN Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission does expressly mention the Chadian border, 
but it only entrusts the peacekeepers with the task ofonitoring and reporting on the 
security situation along that border. It might be argued that the peacekeepers 
would be hampered from effectively monitoring the situation if they are deprived 
of the possibility of crossing the border. Although it has been pointed out that the 
interpretation of SC resolutions demands that less importance be attached to the 
minutiae of language, there is no indication that the wording in para 54 (h) was 
meant to entail the directive to cross the border into Chad. 
b) Para 54 (b) report of the SG and the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
Paragraph 54 (b) of the UN/AU report mandates the peacekeepers to prevent 
attacks against civilians, within its areas of deployment.376 A textual approach to 
this provision reveals that the forces could invoke this paragraph as a ground for a 
cross-border competence, if attacks occurred against civilians in the Chadian 
border region, provided that this region would still fall within the area of 
deployment of the UNAMID force. But the area of deployment excludes all 
Chadian territory,377 and consequently paragraph 54 (b) of the UN/AU report does 
not provide a basis for a cross-border competence of the UNAMID peacekeepers. 
c) Para 54 (c) report of the SG and the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
Paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report mandates UNAMID to, inter alia, 
verify the implementation of various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004. 
Alongside the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006,378 this could also include 
the peace deals that were concluded between Chad and Sudan, namely the Tripoli 
Peace Agreement of February 2006,379 and the Reconciliation Agreement of May 
2007.380 Consequently, if the UNAMID task included verifying the 
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implementation of these peace agreements, paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report 
might constitute a basis for a cross-border competence of the peacekeepers, 
depending on the exact substance of the peace deals. However, this assumption 
raises several problems: First of all it must be examined whether or not the 
referral in paragraph 54 (c) includes the Chadian-Sudanese agreements. Then, 
provided that it does, it needs to be determined whether the respective peace 
agreements contain provisions which constitute a sufficient basis for a cross-
border competence of the UNAMID troops. This must include an interpretation of 
what “verification” of the peace deal means. If a sufficient basis for the 
competence can be found, the sovereignty of Chad is the next obstacle, triggering 
the question of whether Chad must consent to such a task in order for the 
peacekeepers to be permitted to cross the border. Finally, if this question is 
answered in the affirmative, it must be established whether there is the possibility 
of an exception from this requirement. 
(1) Referral to peace agreements between Sudan and Chad 
Paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report only mentions the “implementation of 
various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004”. Within this period of time the 
April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement,381 the Darfur Peace Agreement of 
May 2006,382 the 60 day-truce in January 2007383 and the two aforementioned 
peace deals between Chad and Sudan – the  Tripoli Peace Agreement and the 
2007 Reconciliation Agreement – have been signed. The UN/AU report does not 
clarify whether or not the declarations signed by Chad and Sudan were meant to 
be included, neither do the other documents which established UNAMID provide 
any help. 
From a textual point of view, these two Chadian-Sudanese agreements 
would be included, since they constitute “ceasefire agreements”. However, it 
seems to be problematic that these peace deals were, inter alia, signed by a party 
which is external to the proximate Darfur conflict and, to be more precise, is a 
foreign sovereign state. But although the two declarations have this external 
element, they also comprise obligations for the Sudanese government, which gave 
its consent to the presence of the peacekeepers and to their responsibility to verify 
the implementation of peace deals. Therefore it seems to be logical to view the 
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two agreements between Sudan and Chad to be included by the referral in 
paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report. The fact that another sovereign state is also 
party to the agreement is a separate problem which will be dealt with in section 
(3).   
(2) Content of the Sudanese-Chadian peace agreements 
The next essential questions are what “verification” of the peace agreements 
mean and whether these deals between Chad and Sudan contain provisions for 
whose implementation the peacekeepers would need to cross the Chadian border. 
Paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report authorizes UNAMID to “monitor, 
observe compliance with and verify the implementation of [...] ceasefire 
agreements”. Both the ordinary meaning of that term and the context of the 
provision suggest that “verification” is meant to comprise “all necessary means” 
and thereby denotes the authority to use force: If the term was understood to fall 
short of that meaning, it would constitute a mere repetition of the instruction to 
observe compliance with the peace agreements. For the context, recourse may be 
taken to the provisions of SC resolution 1769, where paragraph 15 (a) (ii) 
authorises the peacekeepers to take the necessary action to support early and 
effective implementation (of the Darfur peace agreement). All this indicates that 
verification must be understood in a broad sense. The question which remains to 
be answered is whether the Chadian-Sudanese peace deals contain provisions that 
require the peacekeepers to cross the border. 
The Tripoli Peace Agreement stipulates in its article 4 that both parties 
“pledge to prohibit forthwith the presence of rebel elements from either country in 
their respective territories”.384 In article 7 it states that the two parties agree to 
establish, inter alia, “a peace and security force to secure the common border”.385 
If article 4 is to be implemented, this inevitably necessitates access to the 
regions on both sides of the Chadian-Sudanese border and a peace and security 
force, established in accordance with article 7, would likewise be inhibited from 
performing its duties if it could only operate on one side of the border.  
Therefore the provisions of the Tripoli Peace Agreement would notionally 
authorise the UNAMID troops to cross the border. Consequently it needs to be 
examined whether the sovereignty of Chad can overcome that conclusion. 
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(3) Sovereignty of Chad 
As a general rule, the United Nations have to respect the sovereignty of each 
member state, which means that they are not authorised to intervene in the internal 
affairs of a member state unless that state consented to the interference.386 There 
is, however, an exception to this rule: the Security Council can decide to apply 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.387 
Consequently, the hypothetical presence of UNAMID troops on Chadian 
territory could either be authorised by the consent of the government of Chad or 
by an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The Chadian government did not participate in the negotiations between the 
UN Secretary General and the Sudanese government which led to the agreement 
concerning the establishment of the UNAMID force.388 Nevertheless Chad might 
have given its consent to the presence of the peacekeepers in the Chadian border 
areas. In this regard it is necessary to examine whether, by signing the Sudanese-
Chadian Reconciliation Deal in May 2007,389 Chad agreed to allow the 
peacekeeping forces on its territory. In this Saudi-brokered agreement, Chad 
promised, inter alia,  to support AU and UN efforts to stabilize the Darfur region 
of Sudan and neighbouring border areas in eastern Chad.390 This pledge was given 
in May 2007, when the plan for a joint UN/AU peacekeeping force has already 
been finalised, its deployment only pending the consent of the Sudanese 
government.391 So it might be argued that, since the Chadian government was 
fully aware of the possible deployment of a strong peacekeeping force in the 
border region, it meant to allow them unconfined access to Chadian territory. 
However, this assumption has no ground, for the simple reason that by signing the 
Reconciliation Agreement the Sudanese government made the same pledge to 
support AU and UN efforts, yet at the same time it had not given its consent to the 
establishment of the UNAMID force.392 Therefore it is highly unrealistic to 
conclude from the declaration which was delivered by the Chadian government in 
the course of the Reconciliation Agreement in May 2007, that Chad gave its 
                                               
386
 Cf. article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
387
 Art 2 (7) UNC. 
388
 Cf. Darfur – UNAMID – Background (note 1). 
389
 Cf. supra, chapter III, C. 8., p. 39. 
390
 PR Newswire, “Saudi Arabia Brokers Agreement Between Sudan and Chad on Darfur” (note 
299). 
391
 PR Newswire, “Saudi Arabia Brokers Agreement Between Sudan and Chad on Darfur” (note 
299). 
392
 See supra, chapter III, C. / D., p. 36 et seq. 
- 54 - 
consent for the presence of UN/AU peacekeepers on its territory. In the absence of 
other statements by the Chadian authorities, which could suggest an approval of 
UNAMID operations in Chadian border areas, it must be concluded that there is 
no such consent. 
(4) Consent of Chad 
Since Chad did not permit UNAMID forces to operate in its territory, it must 
be examined whether the peacekeepers are mandated to operate in the border 
areas even without Chadian consent.  
Paragraph 15 (ii) of SC resolution 1769 vests UNAMID with Chapter VII 
authority to “take the necessary action [...] to prevent [...] armed attacks and 
protect civilians”.393 Therefore, given the situation of a civilian crossing the 
border to Chad while being pursued by an attacker, paragraph 15 might be 
interpreted to give a sufficient mandate to the peacekeepers to enable them to 
cross the border into Chad even without Chad consenting to their presence on its 
territory. At least at first sight; because a closer look reveals that paragraph 15 
only authorises UNAMID to enforce action “in the areas of deployment of its 
forces”.394  
Consequently it must be concluded that SC resolution 1769 does not provide 
a sufficient basis for operations in the Chadian border areas: the lack of consent 
by Chad cannot be overcome and therefore paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report 
does not provide UNAMID with a mandate to cross the border into Chad. 
d) UN/AU laws and customary international law  
Finally it has to be examined whether the UN and AU peacekeeping laws or 
customary international law provides a different ground for a cross border 
competence in such a case. 
(1) Article 4 (j) PSC Protocol  
Article 4 (j) of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council, which vests the African Union with the right to intervene in a 
Member State, does not provide any help because it requires an antecedent 
decision by the African Union Assembly and cannot be invoked directly by a 
peacekeeping force.395 
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(2) Responsibility to protect 
Another possible basis for the competence to cross the border in order to 
protect civilians could be contained in the so called “responsibility to protect”. 
This concept was incorporated into the outcome document of the 2005 World 
Summit and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and the idea 
behind it is that, although the responsibility for protecting civilians resides 
primarily with the host state, the principle of non-intervention will yield to the 
international responsibility to protect in cases in which the host state proves to be 
unable or unwilling to fulfil its duties.396 So it might be argued that peacekeepers 
who operate on the Sudanese side of the border with Chad have the responsibility 
to protect civilians on Chadian territory if Chad does not secure their inviolacy. 
However, for two reasons this assumption is a very problematic one: first it has 
been asserted that rather than being a solid legal norm, the concept only 
constituted political rhetoric and therefore was not capable of superseding claims 
of national sovereignty.397 Second, paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, which addresses the responsibility to protect, cannot be 
invoked directly as a basis for a cross border competence by the peacekeepers; it 
only declares that the world’s heads of state and government “are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council”.398 Therefore the concept of the responsibility to protect does not 
provide a sufficient basis for UNAMID presence on Chadian territory. 
(3) Hot pursuit 
The right of hot pursuit might allow the peacekeepers to cross the border 
into Chad. There may be a rule of customary international law which justifies the 
UNAMID forces to follow attackers over the border in continuation of their chase 
within Darfur, provided the pursuance in Darfur is covered by the UNAMID 
mandate. 
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As an extension of the right to self-defence, the right of hot pursuit entitles a 
state to continue the chase of wrongdoers outside its frontiers, provided that the 
pursuit begins immediately after the attacker’s wrongful act and is continued 
without interruption.399 Although this right may also find expression on land and 
in the air, it has only been codified in the international law of the sea.400 However, 
the problematic aspect is that the right of hot pursuit only extends the territorial 
jurisdiction of a state into the high seas, into the air space over high seas or into no 
man’s land; crossing of the boundaries of another state is not permitted unless an 
agreement exists to that effect.401  
Therefore the UNAMID peacekeepers once again have to respect the 
sovereignty of Chad and cannot invoke the right of hot pursuit to cross the border.  
(4) Necessity 
The last possible ground for a cross-border competence is necessity. This 
concept of customary international law can be invoked by a state to justify the use 
of force in protection of important domestic interests, e.g. the protection of its 
citizens.402 But in order for necessity to be successfully invoked, a hazard which 
emanates from Chad and takes effect in Darfur is required. In other words, 
necessity might be relied on to cross the border if rebels from Chadian territory 
launched attacks on their victims in Darfur, without entering Sudan. In reality, 
rebels enter Darfur and operate there, and they cross the border into Chad and 
attack civilians on the Chadian side of the border. While the offenders are in 
Darfur, the UNAMID troops are within their area of deployment and might be 
mandated to confront the rebels.403 But when the rebels cross the border into 
Chad, the concept of necessity cannot authorize the peacekeepers to follow them. 
e) Conclusion 
Paragraphs 54 (b), (c) and (h) of the UN/AU report may at first sight seem to 
authorise the peacekeepers to operate on Chadian territory, but it has been shown 
that neither of the three paragraphs provides a valid basis for such a competence. 
Since the relevant documents which established UNAMID contain no further 
provisions that might mandate the peacekeepers to cross the border and since the 
                                               
399
 NM Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law, p.2 
400
 Poulantzas (note 399), p. 1; cf article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) 
and article 111 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
401
 Poulantzas (note 399), p. 2. 
402
 M Herdegen, Völkerrecht, p. 233. 
403
 This will be dealt with in chapter IV. C., see infra, p. 57. 
- 57 - 
UN and AU peacekeeping laws provide no further grounds, it must be concluded 
that UNAMID is not authorised to operate in the Chadian border regions. The 
peacekeepers’ powers ratione loci comprise the whole of Darfur, but end at the 
Sudanese border.  
C. Extent of powers ratione materiae 
1. Introduction 
It has been repeatedly asserted that paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the 
UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission establish the 
mandate of UNAMID. From these provisions it arises that the core mandate of the 
peacekeepers is the protection of civilians, as well as “contributing to security for 
humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, 
assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human 
rights and rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the 
borders with Chad and the CAR”.404 
This section will focus on the extent of powers ratione materiae with regard 
to the various militias and those supporting them. As was delineated in chapter III, 
the Darfur conflict is dominated by the presence of different militias; the 
Janjaweed with its support from the government and, on the other side of the 
conflict, several rebel movements.405  
In order for the peacekeepers to effectively halt the warring factions from 
fighting, it is important to know if and to what extent they have subject matter 
competence over the militia forces and over those who back them.  
2. Relevant provisions with regard to the mandate ratione materiae 
The relevant provisions concerning subject matter competence over 
Janjaweed and other militia groups as well as over their facilitators can be found 
in paragraph 55 of the UN/AU report, which specifies the broad tasks outlined in 
paragraph 54. 
Para 55 mandates the force to 
(b) (i) promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in 
monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and 
disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively 
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providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment and buffer zones, by 
monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid police, 
including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are 
concentrated [...] 
(b) (iii) monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Janjaweed and other 
militias 
(b) (v) assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration programme called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement 
Since paragraph 55 bears reference to the Darfur Peace Agreement, the 
relevant provisions of this agreement must be singled out as well. Chapter three of 
the peace deal is concerned with ceasefire and security arrangements and in 
various parts it reflects the duty of the signatories to co-operate with AMIS, the 
predecessor of UNAMID.406 
Article 27 of the Darfur Peace Agreement is, inter alia, concerned with 
military disengagement and arms control and states in paragraph 315 that 
a. The GoS shall restrict all Janjaweed/armed militia and PDF to their headquarters, 
garrisons, cantonment sites or communities and take other steps to contain, reduce 
and ultimately eliminate the threat posed by such forces. 
b. The GoS shall completely disarm the above forces of heavy weapons. 
c. [...] the GoS shall ensure that no Janjaweed/armed militia pose a threat to the 
Movements’ assembly and disarmament. 
In paragraph 367 it specifies this duty to disarm the Janjaweed militia and 
stipulates that 
The GoS shall implement the relevant stages of its plan for neutralising, controlling 
and disarming the Janjaweed/armed militia in its areas of control. Its operations shall 
be conducted in coordination with AMIS and with prior notification to the Ceasefire 
Commission. This stage of the plan shall include: 
(a) Enforcement operations in selected localities with the intent of apprehending and 
disarming. 
(b) Confiscation of heavy and long-range weapons systems, crew operated weapons 
and motor vehicles. 
(c) Prosecutions and punitive actions against criminal elements. 
(d) Any other such actions as are contained in the plan and agreed by the Ceasefire 
Commission. 
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3. Extent of powers ratione materiae over those supporting the militias 
Now the exact extent of the powers which emanate from the pertinent 
provisions in  paragraph 55 needs to be established, taking into account all the 
conclusions which were drawn earlier in this thesis and also bearing in mind the 
relevant passages of the Darfur Peace Agreement. 
The point of departure of this examination will be the observation that the 
warring factions have the duty to disarm their militias. So it has to be determined 
what consequences are triggered in case of non-compliance with that duty. It also 
has to be scrutinized what exactly “verification of the disarmament” by UNAMID 
means. 
a) Duty to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias and its consequences 
Paragraph 55 (b) (i), (iii) and (v) of the UN/AU report mandates UNAMID 
to monitor, verify and assist in the disarmament process which on its part is 
governed by the provision in chapter III of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The 
assumption which I seek to examine in this section is the following: If the parties 
to the Darfur conflict have a duty to disengage and disarm their respective militias 
and UNAMID is authorized to verify this disarming, then maybe this means the 
peacekeepers are simultaneously mandated to forcefully proceed against any 
fighting militiamen as well as against anyone who supports the Janjaweed or other 
militias, since fighting and any support constitutes an infringement of this duty to 
disarm. 
First of all the term “verification” must be interpreted, but since it is used in 
the same context as in paragraph 54 (c) of the UN/AU report, it is possible to 
draw on the respective conclusions and to understand “verification” to comprise 
the use of force.407 But it remains to be examined whether paragraph 55 (b) of the 
UN/AU report mandates the peacekeepers to proceed against supporters of the 
militias. 
A textual approach to the provisions in paragraph 55 (b) reveals that there is 
no express authorization to actively stop a facilitator of the militias. At the same 
time it is perspicuous that the purpose of the provisions presupposes the 
peacekeepers to be able to stop anyone who infringes their duty to comply with 
the peace deal. Therefore, concluding from the mere existence of the provisions in 
paragraph 55 (b), internal logic demands a wide interpretation which includes the 
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mandate to prevent any activities contrary to the disarming process. However, 
taking into account the general principles of peacekeeping and the circumstances 
of adoption of the provisions in paragraph 55 (b) of the UN/AU report might 
result in a different conclusion. 
The most important contextual factor of the provision’s enactment is the 
fierce opposition by the Sudanese government against the deployment of 
UNAMID and the fact that Khartoum not only backed the Janjaweed, but even 
relied on them in its conflict with the Darfurian rebel factions.408 Considering the 
historical – yet unfirm – principle of relying on the consent of the host state for 
the deployment of a peacekeeping force,409 it is obvious that a wide interpretation 
of the UNAMID mandate ratione materiae with regard to those supporting the 
militias endangers the continuity of Sudanese consent. Yet again the principle of 
neutrality, which is also a key concept of peacekeeping operations,410 demands of 
the peacekeepers to treat all supporters of the militias equally, no matter whether 
they are members of the GoS or of any other party to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement.  
If one seeks to weigh the two principles, which lead to contesting 
assumptions concerning the interpretation of paragraph 55 (b) (i), (iii) and (v) of 
the UN/AU report, one must bear in mind that in intrastate conflicts the need for 
consent no longer plays such a prominent role;411 it was overridden by 
humanitarian concerns.412 Moreover, UNAMID is vested with chapter VII 
authority to “support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement”,413 which applies in this case, other than for a potential ratione loci 
cross border competence, because here UNAMID is within its area of deployment 
as required by paragraph 15 (a) of SC resolution 1769. 
In conclusion, a wide interpretation of the tasks in paragraph 55 (b) (i), (iii) 
and (v) of the UN/AU report takes preference over a narrow one, therefore 
UNAMID must be regarded as being authorised to proceed not only against 
fighting militia forces, but also against any facilitator of Janjaweed or other 
militias. Nevertheless the peacekeepers must act with caution, since a withdrawal 
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of the Sudanese consent, although it would not necessarily determine the 
UNAMID mission, would impair the already poor cooperation of the Sudanese 
government. The UN/AU report provides the following estimation: “The 
operation’s success depends critically on whether the Government of the Sudan 
will come to see the United Nations and the hybrid operation as part of the 
solution to the conflict in Darfur.”414 
b) Conclusion 
Along with the other signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the 
Sudanese government has a duty to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias. By 
being mandated to “verify” the implementation of this obligation, UNAMID is 
authorized to arrest all support given to Janjaweed and other militias. 
D. Extent of powers over Sudanese forces 
1. Introduction 
The final question this thesis will deal with is the extent of UNAMID’s 
powers over the Sudanese army. As a general principle, peacekeeping forces do 
not have command over the host state’s army; they have to respect the sovereignty 
of that state and in addition, handing down instructions to the army would run 
contrary to the principle of neutrality of the peacekeepers.415 The only exception 
and therefore the only possible way for the UNAMID troops to issue imperatives 
to the Sudanese forces is the hypothetical consent of the Sudanese government 
with regard to UNAMID tasks which would involve a super ordinate position of 
the peacekeepers in relation to the Sudanese army. Consequently it has to be 
examined whether such consent is existent. Furthermore it is crucial to determine 
the exact mandate of UNAMID in relation to the Sudanese forces, which must 
correspond to that consent. 
2. Relevant provisions and extent of powers over Sudanese forces 
Paragraph 19 of SC resolution 1769 refers to the Joint Communiqué on 
Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur.416 This Communiqué refers to 
the earlier Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary-
                                               
414
 Para 127 of the UN/AU report (note 362). 
415
 See supra, chapter I. A. 3. a), p. 4 et seq. 
416
 Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of 
Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, available at: http://www.unjlc.org/sudan/coord/ 
jointcommuniquedarfur/2007-04-17.8160616366/view [accessed 8 January 2008]. 
- 62 - 
General to Sudan on 3 July 2004.417 At first sight it seems possible for UNAMID 
to invoke the agreements as a basis for powers over the Sudanese army, because 
the government offered to facilitate full access for humanitarian activities. So as 
far as the Sudanese army might obstruct the peacekeepers in their task of 
implementing the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, UNAMID, it might be 
argued, is mandated to issue orders to the Sudanese forces. However, the two 
Joint Communiqués do not contain provisions which would elaborate on the role 
of the Sudanese Army. Therefore paragraph 19 of SC resolution 1769 does not 
provide any help in establishing the relationship between the peacekeeping forces 
and the Sudanese army. 
Paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the UN Secretary-General and the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission remain silent on the issue of peacekeepers’ 
powers with regard to the Sudanese forces. Both these paragraphs and paragraph 
15 of SC resolution 1769, which vests UNAMID with Chapter VII authority,418 
only contain the task of implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent 
armed attacks and to protect civilians. 
Therefore it must be asserted that there is a lack of provisions which could 
express Khartoum’s consent to a super ordinate position of the peacekeepers in 
relation to the Sudanese army. This conclusion is fortified by the wording of 
paragraph 63 of the UN/AU report, which only mentions the peacekeepers’ “close 
cooperation with national and local authorities”.419 
3. Conclusion 
The various documents which establish UNAMID contain no provisions 
which would grant the peacekeeping forces axiomatic powers over the Sudanese 
army. Consequently the peacekeepers can only exercise power over the Sudanese 
forces by resorting to their Chapter VII authority if paragraph 15 of SC resolution 
1769 applies. That requires a situation in which UNAMID needs to “protect its 
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment [...]”,420 implement the Darfur 
Peace Agreement, prevent armed attacks or protect civilians.421 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
A. UN and AU peacekeeping principles 
Early UN peacekeeping missions established three basic principles for their 
operations: impartiality, consent of the parties to the conflict and the prohibition 
of the use of force other than in self defence.422 However, in recent times and 
especially in civil war conflicts, the peacekeepers find themselves confronted with 
a multitude of new dangers and problems.423 This made it necessary to advance 
these principles and hence to back away from both the strict prohibition of the use 
of force and the absolute requirement of the parties’ consent.424 
As for the AU peacekeeping rules, it was concluded that the AU Act has 
some powerful provisions, expressly enabling the African Union to intervene in a 
member state in respect of grave circumstances.425 On the other hand both the 
AU’s and its predecessor, the OAU’s list of successful peacekeeping missions is 
barely existent and therefore the AU is hindered from resorting to its own 
established principles.426  
Chapter I also stated that the relationship between the African Union and the 
United Nations is somewhat uncertain with regard to issues related to 
international peace and security.427 This is a realm which remains to be shaped by 
the new type of co-operation of the joint African Union/United Nations 
peacekeeping mission. 
Finally chapter I drew the conclusion that there is disunity when it comes to 
the exact basis for the authorisation of UN-peacekeeping missions.428 However, 
irrespective of that dispute, we will always find a Security Council resolution 
mandating the respective operation.429 
B. Interpretation of SC resolutions 
Chapter II reflected the problem that there is little authority available with 
regard to the interpretation of Security Council resolutions.430 The different 
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doctrinal schools of thought to treaty interpretation, namely the textual, the 
teleological and the subjective approach,431 should only be applied to SC 
resolution interpretation with caution.432 Since SC resolutions are often drafted by 
non-lawyers under immense political pressure, less attention should be paid to the 
precise wording, while a stronger focus should lie in the circumstances of the 
adoption.433 Consequently, in order to understand the provisions of a SC 
resolution, one must always be familiar with the background of the drafting 
process and with the underlying conflict. 
C. The background of the Darfur conflict 
Chapter III gave a short version of a long and complex conflict, which is 
dominated by various rebel movements and which is strongly affected by the 
position of the Sudanese government.434 Five different peace agreements were 
singled out, because SC resolution 1769 refers to them and thus they play an 
important role in understanding UNAMID’s mandate.435 These peace agreements 
were concluded between the Sudanese government and the different rebel 
movements or between the Sudan and Chad and each of them was only a small 
step on the long way to a peaceful Darfur.436 
After its persistent and fierce opposition against a joint peacekeeping force, 
the Sudanese government finally gave in and thereby cleared the path for the 
deployment of UNAMID.437 
D. Mandate ratione loci 
It has been demonstrated that UNAMID’s mandate emanates from 
paragraph 1 of SC resolution 1769 in conjunction with paragraphs 54 and 55 of 
the report of the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission.438 The peacekeepers’ powers ratione loci comprises the whole of 
Darfur and several provisions of paragraph 54 of the UN/AU report at first sight 
seem to even authorise the peacekeepers to operate on Chadian territory.439 
However, it has been shown that neither of the stipulations provide a valid basis 
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for such a competence.440 At the same time there are no UN or AU peacekeeping 
laws or rules of customary international law which could furnish the peacekeepers 
with authorisation to cross the border into Chad.441 Therefore it must be 
concluded that the extent of powers ratione loci only stretches as far as to the 
Chadian border. 
E. Mandate ratione materiae 
It has been noted that the core mandate of the UNAMID peacekeepers is the 
protection of civilians, the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the 
establishment of a stable and secure environment in Darfur.442 
The question that has been examined in the last part of this thesis was the 
extent of powers which the peacekeepers have with regard to belligerent militia 
forces and those supporting them and also with regard to the Sudanese army.443 
From the existence of some provisions in paragraph 55 of the UN/AU report 
and from the duty of the warring factions to disarm their militias, which arises 
from these provisions, it has been concluded that the peacekeepers task to verify 
the disengagement and disarming of the militias must be interpreted in a broad 
sense.444 Consequently it must be regarded as including authorisation to proceed 
not only against fighting militia forces, but also against any facilitator of 
Janjaweed or other militias.445 
At the same time, due to a lack of authorisation, UNAMID is not mandated 
to exercise powers over the Sudanese army, except for situations in which 
paragraph 15 of SC resolution 1769 applies.446 
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